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1 Introduction
Information processing and decision making by firms are typically not done
by one person. Rather decisions are made by groups of people either in com-
mittees or hierarchical structures. Bounded rationality and computational
costs preclude the possibility of any one agent collecting, processing and de-
ciding about information relevant to the firm and its profitability. Large
firms, for example, employ hundreds, even thousands, of “managers” who
do not produce or sell anything, but rather process information and make
decisions (Radner, 1993).
Building on previous work (Barr and Saraceno, 2005), we model the firm
as a type of artificial neural network (ANN) that must make output decisions
in a Cournot duopoly framework. ANNs are common in computer science and
psychology, where they have been used for pattern recognition and modeling
of the brain (Croall and Mason, 1992; Skapura, 1996). In economics, neural
networks have been employed as non-linear forecasting equations (Kuan and
White, 1992).
Here we use ANNs as a model of a firm’s organization, which allows us
to make explicit the nature and the costs and benefits of processing informa-
tion. Agents within the firm are required to evaluate data and communicate
this evaluation to others who then make final decisions. As discussed in Barr
and Saraceno (2002; 2005), the benefit to the firm of increased resources de-
voted to information processing (IP) is better knowledge of the environment;
but the costs include the wage of IP agents, and, especially, the time costs
involved with processing and communicating this information.
Barr and Saraceno (2005) investigate how learning aﬀects a firm’s ability
to produce along the best response function in a Cournot duopoly game
with unknown demand. In that setting, firms choose an output level after
observing the state of the environment. After the market clearing price
reveals the true position of demand and the opponent’s output choice, firms
compare their output choices to the best response they should have played.
We show that ANNs can learn to converge to the Nash equilibrium output,
given the environmental complexity. Further we show how environmental
complexity aﬀects both optimal organizational size and profits. In Barr and
Saraceno (2005) we do not consider the possibility of collusion, in the sense
that firms could possibly learn to restrict their outputs, thus gaining larger
profits.
The diﬃculty of learning the environment aﬀects a firm’s ability to coop-
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erate because in complex environments a firm will have trouble distinguishing
whether the variation in the market clearing price is coming from changing
environmental characteristics or from the variation in their rival’s strategy.
This problem has been the subject of several works (see, for example, Green
and Porter, 1984). We study a similar problem in the framework of adap-
tive, multi-agent firms who have to learn how the environment aﬀects their
demand curves, and whether the other duopolist is willing to cooperate or
not.
While U.S. antitrust law prohibits outright collusion, the temptation to
collude remains strong. In fact, price-fixing cases continues be the most
frequent type of case prosecuted by the U.S. Department of Justice (Viscusi,
et al., 2001). Under current antitrust law, proving price-fixing requires the
presence of a “smoking gun,” such as price-fixing agreement documents; tacit
collusion cannot be prosecuted under current law (Viscusi, et al., 2001).
Thus firms have the incentive to try to raise prices tacitly by sending signals
to other firms about their willingness to cooperate to restrict output and
raise prices. We are interested in understanding what types of competitive
environments can foster tacit collusion.
In our model two neural networks compete in a repeated duopoly setting.
Each period, the firms (networks) view an environmental state vector (an
N-length vector of 00s and 10s) which they use to estimate two variables:
the intercept parameter of the demand curve and their rival’s output. Each
firm uses its estimate of its rival’s output to guess whether it is going to
defect or cooperate. This guess is also determined by its own predisposition
to cooperate, which we capture by means of a “niceness” parameter. If the
estimate of the rival’s output is greater than the shared-monopoly output
plus some margin depending on its “niceness,” the firm plays the (estimated)
Cournot best response, otherwise it plays the (estimated) shared-monopoly
response. In this sense, both firms are playing a kind of tit-for-tat strategy:
“I will defect if I think you are going to defect, otherwise I will cooperate.”
After choosing an output, the firm observes the market clearing price,
the rival’s output and the true demand intercept, which allows it to compute
estimation errors; these are then used to improve its performance in subse-
quent periods. Thus the knowledge of both the environment and the rival’s
past decisions lie within the network itself, rather than any one agent; the
network serves as a economical knowledge storage device. The questions we
ask are:
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• What is the relationship between network size, learning and profitabil-
ity given that firms are learning both the environment and their oppo-
nent’s behavior?
• How does environmental complexity aﬀect performance, cooperation
and profits?
• How are a firm’s profits and cooperation aﬀected by “niceness,” i.e., the
firm’s willingness to forgive deviations from the cooperative output, and
its rival’s size and niceness?
To anticipate some of our results, first we show that firms in this setting
are able to learn, and they converge to the equilibrium of the Cournot game.
Next we show that environmental complexity and firm dimension interact
in a complex way in regard to both profits and cooperation. Performance
and cooperation depend on, not only the diﬃculty of the IP task, but also
firm sizes and the willingness of each firm to cooperate. Further, we show
that environmental complexity aﬀects, in equilibrium, total industry size
(defined as the number of agents in the two firms), but has mixed eﬀects on
cooperation.
In the next section we briefly review the literature to which our work
relates. Section 3 outlines the standard Cournot model that we use, which
is an extension of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Next, section 4
discusses the particular game that the neural networks play and the charac-
terization of the economic environment. In section 5 we discuss the workings
of the particular ANN that we use. Then sections 6 to 8 present the results
of our simulation experiments. Finally, in section 9 we conclude.
2 Related Literature
There is a rich literature on the issue of cooperation and defection in Pris-
oner’s Dilemma games, of which the Cournot game is a variant. In this
general framework, two players must make a decision over whether to co-
operate or defect. The result (payoﬀ) of the decision, however, is aﬀected
by the rival’s decision. If decisions have to be made repeatedly and there
is little prospect that the game will end in a short time, then mutual sus-
tained cooperation is possible, even if there is no direct communication. In
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the Cournot game, firms can signal their willingness to cooperate over time
by choosing low output over high output. If the other firm “takes the bait”
by also producing a low output, then there can be mutual gain.
In terms of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD), a standard theoretic
result is the “folk theorem,” which says that if agents are patient enough,
then there is an infinite number of Nash Equilibrium outcomes that have
higher payoﬀs than the “defect every period” strategy (the so-called min-
max payoﬀ) (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
Recently, models of the RPD have also been concerned with bounded
rationality and the evolution of cooperation. Rubinstein (1986) and Cho
(1994) model agents as boundedly rational automata-type machines. Rubin-
stein’s machine is a finite automata and Cho’s is a simple perceptron. These
papers show the types of equilibria that can arise. If, for example, there
is a bound placed on level of complexity in Rubinstein’s machine then only
a finite number of equilibrium outcomes can be generated. Cho’s machine
is able to “recover” the perfect folk theorem using a neural network that
maintains an upper bound on the complexity of equilibrium strategies.
While these papers focus on the nature of the machines and the nature of
the equilibria outcomes, other papers focus on the evolution of cooperation
(Axelrod, 1997; Miller, 1996; Ho, 1996). For example, Miller demonstrates
how cooperation can evolve over time if automata machines adapt using a
genetic algorithm (Holland, 1975) that allows the strategic environment to
change. Axelrod (1997) also models the RPD with a genetic algorithm, but
fixes the population of possible strategies.
Our paper relates to the literature on adaptive machines that play a
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game. Our focus is a little diﬀerent in that
we investigate the role that network structure and environmental complexity
play in the outcome of the game. For simplicity we limit our attention
to a type of tit-for-tat strategy, and focus on the learning process, and on
the relationships between firm size/complexity, environmental complexity,
profitability and cooperation.
Cournot competition is a common application of RPD games (see Tirole,
1988, for example). In these models collusion is possible if firms are suﬃ-
ciently patient and the threat of punishment exists (Verboven, 1997). Cyret
and DeGroot (1973) show that firms can cooperate over time by a process of
Bayesian learning. Vriend (2000) presents an adaptive model of a Cournot
game, where agents evolve according to a genetic algorithm. He shows how
equilibrium market outcomes can be diﬀerent depending on whether agents
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perform individual rather than social learning. Our model is similar to these
papers in the sense that firms are adaptive, but we also look at the eﬀect of
environmental complexity and the (heterogeneous) willingness to cooperate
(the “niceness” parameter).
This paper is also related to recent work on agent-based economics, in two
diﬀerent senses of the term.1 First, our conception of the firm as an artificial
neural network fits within the set of recent models discussed by Chang and
Harrington (2006), who describe agent-based computational models of firms
as having the following properties (pp. 1276-77): the firm is modeled as a
network of individual agents; these agents typically process information and
transmit this information to others within the network; the firms engage in
adaptive search methods rather than simply playing an equilibrium response;
and the combination of the firm-as-network with adaptive learning prohibits
the presentation of closed-form solutions.
Similar work in this vein include Carley (1996), and DeCanio andWatkins
(1998). In general, these papers study which types of networks minimize the
costs of processing and communicating information. However, our work is
diﬀerent from these models in that we directly model the relationship be-
tween the external environmental variables, firm learning and performance.
In addition, we explicitly apply this framework to a model of Cournot com-
petition and cooperation, which to our knowledge has not been done before
Barr and Saraceno (2005).
Another set of agent-based models include interacting, heterogenous agents,
such as those presented in Axelrod (1997). Our firms-as-agents also display a
degree of inherent heterogeneity in their “types,” or willingness to cooperate,
as well in their size. Similarly to Axelrod (1984), we show that the “person-
ality” of a player’s strategy is an important determinant of the sustainability
of cooperation.
Henrich, et al. (2001) show that players’ willingness to cooperate and
reciprocate varies widely across societies, and is deeply embedded in the
cultures of the players. Organizations, too, have diﬀerent “personalities,”
and corporate cultures (Camerer and Vepsalainen, 1988; Casson, 1991), and
firm behavior and decisions vary, even within the same industries where the
technological, market and institutional structures are often the same (see for
1Arguably there is a third definition of agent-based economic models, not discussed
here, that tries to “grow” economies from the ground up, where simple rules of behavior
can generate complex outcomes. The work of Axtell and Epstein (1996) fits within this
category. See Tesfatsion (2002) for review of these models.
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example, Hannon and Freeman, 1989 and Nelson and Winter, 1982).
3 The Duopoly Framework
This section gives a brief summary of the standard Cournot game. In the
next section we will introduce uncertainty and show how we model firms as
ANNs. Let’s say we have a market with two firms. Each period they face
the demand function
pt = αt − β (q1t + q2t) .
For the moment, we take αt = α as constant and known to the firms. We also
assume that the slope is constant and normalized to one. Profits for each
firm are
πj = [α− (q1 + q2)] qj − cj, j = 1, 2
where cj is costs, such as the cost of network, and without loss of generality
it is set to zero for convenience. Under the standard Cournot assumptions,
the best response function is given by
qbrj =
1
2
[α− q−j] ,
with a Nash Equilibrium quantity and profit of
qne =
α
3
, πne =
α2
9
.
If the two firms could coordinate their output decisions and act as a monopoly
their profit from joint production Q would be
πm = [α−Q]Q.
Assuming the firms share production and profits equally, each would have an
output and profit of
qmj =
α
4
, πmj =
α2
8
> πnej =
α2
9
.
This is a typical prisoner dilemma’s game. In a single shot game, the coop-
eration outcome is not an equilibrium; if one firm knew that its rival would
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play half of the monopoly output, then it could defect by playing its Cournot
best response and achieve a higher payoﬀ:
qdj =
1
2
[α− qm] = 3
8
α
πdj =
9
64
α2 > πmj =
α2
8
.
In in a repeated framework with either infinite or undefined time hori-
zon, however, cooperation may emerge and be sustainable. Suppose that the
game is repeated an infinite number of times, and that firm j0s payoﬀ is given
by the discounted sum of profits, Πj =
P∞
t=1 δ
t−1πjt.2 In this case it can be
shown that if the discount rate is suﬃciently large, almost any strategy in-
volving cooperation (including the tit-for-tat strategy described in the next
section) can be an equilibrium strategy. This is, in fact, what the folk the-
orem mentioned above says: any feasible expected payoﬀ can be sustained
in an equilibrium as long as each player can expect a payoﬀ larger than the
noncooperative one. A backward induction argument, on the other hand,
can show that cooperation is not sustainable if the game is repeated a finite
number of times.
An important extension of the preceding framework that relates to this
paper is the consideration of the eﬀects of uncertainty on the sustainability
of cooperative equilibria (as in Green and Porter, 1984). If the intercept
term of a linear demand function shifts according to a given probability dis-
tribution, then deviations from the collusive price and profit are not directly
attributable to the competitor’s unwillingness to cooperate, but may stem
from shifts in the demand function. The punishment scheme designed by a
firm to enforce cooperation needs to be more complex. This typically in-
volves a tradeoﬀ whose outcome depends on the particular model adopted:
if the punishment is too harsh, the firm loses possible advantages from col-
lusion; but if it is too light, then the partner may be tempted to cheat. To
sustain cooperation firms have to punish their opponents only if prices and
profits deviate “too much” from the cooperative level. We adopt a similar
perspective in what follows, with a crucial diﬀerence: uncertainty can be re-
duced through firm learning. Our focus, in fact, is on this learning process,
and on how it aﬀects the prospect for cooperation. Notice, too, that the
2Notice that δ can either be interpreted as the discount factor of an infinitely repeated
game, or as the probability that the game is repeated after each round when the game
length is undefined.
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patience necessary to maintain cooperation in the deterministic model be-
comes less relevant in the stochastic case, where environmental eﬀects are
relatively more important. This is shown by Levenstein and Suslow (2006),
who discuss the eﬀect of demand changes have on cartel duration.
4 A Model of Firm Learning in a Repeated
Cournot Game
4.1 Firm Strategies
In this paper each network adopts a variant of the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy.
The standard TFT strategy says that a firm should begin by cooperating,
and then use the same behavior as the rival’s prior action. This strategy, in
general, conforms to the four rules-of-thumb discussed by Axelrod (1984) for
strategies that are likely to promote cooperation among boundedly rational
agents. (1) Be nice: never be the first to defect. (2) Be forgiving: be willing
to return to cooperation even if your opponent defects. (3) Be simple: the
easier it is for your rival to discover a pattern in your behavior, the easier it is
for him to learn to cooperate. (4) Don’t be envious: don’t ask how well you
are doing compared to your rival, but rather try to see how you can improve
your own performance.
In industrial organization, collusion has a long history, and forms the
basis, for example, of U.S. antitrust law and competition policy. Since out-
right collusion is illegal, firms may find it in their best interest to signal their
willingness to collude. A simple way two model this possibility is to have
two firms maintain a simple strategy, such as TFT. The issue then becomes:
given that each firm has a willingness to collude, what are the environmental
and organizational factors that determine whether collusion is a feasible and
sustainable outcome of the game? Here, for example, a grim-trigger or related
strategy would simply not work due to the error that a firm makes when eval-
uating a rival’s actions. In addition, a more sophisticated strategy is likely to
produce too much “noise” to generate cooperation. In our framework TFT
allows for the possibility of cooperation once firms learn to distinguish the
part of price variation that is due to environmental change versus the part
due to their rival’s output decisions. We leave the introduction of evolving
strategies for future work.
We employ, however, a slight variation of the TFT strategy. Since firms
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estimate both the demand parameter and their rival’s output quantity each
period, they must use this information to decide whether to defect or not.
More specifically the firm chooses an output each period based on the fol-
lowing rule (j = 1, 2):
qj =
(
1
2
¡
αˆj − qˆj−j
¢
if
³
qˆj−j −
αˆj
4
´
> ρj
αˆj/4 otherwise
)
, (1)
where qj is firm j0s output, qˆ
j
−j is firm j
0s estimate of its rival’s output, and αˆj
is firm j0s estimate of α. Equation (1) says that if a firm estimates its rival to
be a cheater, i.e., to deviate from forecast monopoly profit (qˆj−j > αˆj/4+ρj),
then it plays the forecasted Cournot output; that is, it defects as well.
The threshold value ρj ≥ 0 represents, as already mentioned, a firm’s
niceness. For relatively small values of ρj, firm j will defect relatively more
often; for large enough values of ρj, the firm will be so nice that it will
never defect. Notice that in making this decision, as in Green and Porter
(1984), the firm has two possible sources of error: the first is the environment,
and the second is the opponent’s quantity; this uncertainty explains why it
will allow a deviation ρj from the monopoly output before reverting to the
noncooperative quantity. We treat ρj as a parameter, and we look at the
evolution of cooperation for exogenous degrees of niceness.3 We allow ρj to
vary across firms, so that it becomes an additional source of heterogeneity.
4.2 The Economic Environment
We represent the external environment as a vector of binary digits, x ∈ {0, 1}N .
The relationship between the environment and the demand intercept is given
by
α (x) =
1
(2N − 1)
NX
k=1
xk2
N−k,
where xk is the kth element of x (time subscripts are dropped for notational
convenience). This functional relationship converts a binary digit vector into
its decimal equivalent. The value of α is normalized to be between 0 and
1 by dividing the sum by 2N − 1. α (x) can be thought of as a weighted
3ρj could be modeled as endogenous (i.e., the history of the game aﬀects not only a
agent’s cooperative behavior, but also its general willingness to cooperate). We leave this
extension for future work.
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sum of the environmental signals, which are arranged in order of increasing
importance. Each period, the firm views an environmental vector x and uses
this information to estimate the intercept of the demand curve.
Each period an environmental vector is randomly chosen with probability
1/2N .4 To measure the complexity of the information processing problem,
we define environmental complexity as the number of bits in the vector, N ;
the more elements that contribute to determine the position of the demand
curve, the more complex is the environment. In the simulations below N
ranges from a minimum of 5 bits to a maximum of 50.
4.3 The Sequence
Each period:
• Firms observe an environmental state vector x.
• Then, based on x, each firm (j = 1, 2) estimates the value of the
intercept parameter, αˆj, and their rival’s choice of output, qˆ
j
−j.
• Next, αˆj and qˆj−j serve as the basis for each firm’s output decision using
the TFT-type rule given by equation (1).
• Firms then observe the true value of α and q−j, and use this information
to determine their errors, using the following rules:5
εαj = (αˆj − α)
2 , (2)
εqj =
( ¡
qˆj−j − q−j
¢2
if
¡
q−j − αj4
¢
> ρj¡
qˆj−j − α4
¢2
otherwise
)
. (3)
Note the contents of equation (3). If the rival’s output is close enough
to the shared monopoly value, the firm will assume that the rival coop-
erated and will compute the error as a deviation from α/4. Otherwise
4For example, for N = 10, each vector has a probability of 0.000977 of being selected.
In the computer science literature, the ANN usually “trains” on a fixed data set and
then is presented new data for forecasting (Croall and Mason, 1992). After training the
network can “generalize” in the sense that it can make forecasts using unseen data. Here,
the networks train and generalize simultaneously.
5Barr and Saraceno (2005) show how profit and error are negatively related, and that
maximizing profit is the same as minimizing the error. For the sake of brevity, we do not
show the equivalent result in this paper.
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it will assume that the rival did not cooperate, and will compute the
error accordingly. This way the rival’s past choices are used as a guide
for the firm’s learning.
• Based on these errors, the firm updates the weight values in its network
for improved performance in the next period. This process is outlined
in the next section.
Notice that each firmmust estimate the intercept of the demand function—
which directly depends on the observed environmental vector— and the rival’s
output choice—which is related to the environment only indirectly via learn-
ing. This feature of the model captures the fact that a firm cannot generally
acquire information about its rival’s strategy (short of industrial espionage)
until it is actually implemented. In most markets, decisions must be made
beforehand, and therefore must rely only on observable environmental infor-
mation.
Though the environmental state does not directly map to output deci-
sions, the networks can still learn the rival’s behavior from observing the
environmental state. This happens because the firms follow the same gen-
eral rules of behavior (i.e., cooperate if estimated output choice of the rival
is not too large, defect otherwise) and thus using the environmental signals
is a reliable indicator of what the rival will do, given that each firm “trains”
to learn its rival’s behavior over time.6
5 The Firm as an Artificial Neural Network
The neural networks that we use as models of the firm are comprised of
three “layers”: the input layer (i.e., the environmental state vectors), a hid-
den/managerial layer, and an output/executive layer. The nodes in the man-
agerial and decision layers represent the information processing behavior of
agents. The number of managers, Mj, captures the information processing
capacity of the firm (in Computational Learning Theory it is referred to as
“hypothesis complexity”; see Niyogi, 1998, p. 23). Hereafter we will call it
the size of the network/firm.
6In future work we could also envision a case where rivals use diﬀerent strategies (or
even evolving ones), and another agent (output node) can be dedicated to learning, for
example, some information about the choice of a rival’s strategy, which could then help a
firm in deciding on an output choice.
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Each agent takes a weighted sum of the information it views and applies a
type of squashing function to produce an output/signal—a value between zero
and one. In the managerial layer, this output is then communicated to the
executive layer. Each output node takes a weighted sum of the signals from
the managerial layer to produce a particular decision: an estimated intercept
value or an estimated rival’s output. A graph of the network is shown in
figure 1.
 
Output/Executive Layer 
Hidden/Managerial Layer 
Input/Environmental Layer 
j
∧α j jq−
∧
Figure 1: Graph of a neural network.
Our choice of ANNs as a models of the firm is motivated by the fact that
the behavior of the network has many features in common with the informa-
tion processing and decision making activities of an organization: (1) The
firm is a coordinated network of agents (nodes), which processes informa-
tion in a decentralized manner, with both parallel and serial computations.
(2) Organizations have hierarchical structures, and thus decisions are made
within decisions. (3) Firms learn by experience; agents become proficient via
trial and error. (4) Organizations must adapt to their environments. That is
to say, firm performance is determined by how well firms can “fit” within the
world in which they operate. (5) As agents process information, they learn
to recognize patterns and, therefore, the firm is able to generalize to new
information. (6) The firm is a coordinated collection of specialized agents.
Thus the knowledge of the firm is greater than the sum of the knowledge
of its agents. (7) Firms that operate in competitive environments generally
have limited resources to devote to information processing, and this compe-
tition imposes time constraints. In short, the network can be thought of as
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a simple, stylized model of the “brains” of a firm’s operations
More accurate learning implies a better understanding of the environ-
ment and more profitable decisions in general, but this accuracy requires
more agents and time. Thus competitive firms face a tradeoﬀ between speed
and accuracy. This tradeoﬀ is also a typical feature of ANNs and of “learn-
ing machines” in general (Niyogi, 1998). On one hand a large network can
asymptotically achieve a very low error, even if the rate of convergence to the
minium possible error is relatively slow.7 On the other hand, a small network
will converge much faster to its minimum attainable error, that nevertheless
will be larger. For a given level of environmental complexity, it is possible
to define an optimal network size that balances speed and accuracy. In a
relatively simple environment, as will be demonstrated below, a small net-
work is the one that best balances this tradeoﬀ since speed is relatively more
important; while as the environmental complexity grows, a larger network is
optimal.
Network j produces its output as follows. Each manager (node) in the
management (hidden) layer takes a weighted sum of the data from the envi-
ronmental layer (of size N). That is, the ith agent in the management layer
of firm j calculates
inhij = w
h
ijx ≡
£
wh1ix1 + . . .+ w
h
NixN
¤
, i = 1, . . . ,Mj; j = 1, 2.
Thus the set of “inputs” to the Mj managers of the management layer is
inhj =
³
inh1j, . . . , in
h
ij, . . . , in
h
Mjj
´
=
³
wh1jx, ...,w
h
ijx, ...,w
h
Mjj
x
´
.
Each manager then transforms the inputs via a squashing function to produce
an output, outhij. Here we use one of the most common squashing functions,
the sigmoid: outhij = g(in
h
ij) = 1/
³
1 + e−in
h
ij
´
. Large negative values are
squashed to zero, high positive ones are squashed to one, and values close to
zero are “squashed” to values close to 0.5.
The vector of processed outputs from the management layer is
outhj =
³
outh1j, . . . , out
h
ij, . . . , out
h
Mjj
´
=
³
g(inh1j), ..., g(in
h
ij), ..., g(in
h
Mjj
)
´
.
7White (1992), for example, has shown that a neural network with an infinite number
of nodes is a universal approximator.
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The inputs to the output layer are weighted sums of the outputs from the
hidden layer:
inoιj = w
o
ιjout
h
j ≡
³
wo1ιjout
h
1j + ...+ w
o
Mj ι jout
h
Mj j
´
, ι = 1, 2.
Finally, the outputs of the network—αˆj and qˆ
j
−j—are determined by transform-
ing inoιj via the sigmoid function,
©
αˆj = g
¡
ino1j
¢
, qˆj−j = g
¡
ino2j
¢ª
. We can
compactly write the input-output nature of the neural network as
αˆj = g
⎛
⎝
MjX
i=1
woi1jg
¡
whijx
¢⎞⎠ ,
qˆj−j = g
⎛
⎝
MjX
i=1
woi2jg
¡
whijx
¢⎞⎠ .
A distinguishing feature of the network is its ability to learn. In this paper
we use the most popular type of learning rule, the Backward Propagation
Network (BPN) algorithm, which owes its name to the fact that learning takes
place by updating the weights at the output layer first and then “backwards”
to the input layer.
Here, after the price is determined and the market clears, firms learn the
true values of α and q−j. They then use this information to calculate the
errors, and update the network weights using a gradient decent algorithm,
which changes the weights in the opposite direction of the gradient of the
error with respect to the weight values.
We begin with a completely untrained network by selecting randomweight
values in the range w ∈ [−0.1, 0.1]. The range of the initial draws, of course,
aﬀects the speed of learning, which is crucial in our setting, but by using
the same range for all networks, we make sure that relative learning per-
formances of diﬀerent networks/firms are unaﬀected. Using diﬀerent weight
ranges does not aﬀect the qualitative results presented below.
The outputs yˆj =
©
αˆj, qˆ
j
−j
ª
are compared to true values to get an error
for each one, according to equations (2) and (3). Total error ξj is then
calculated as
ξj = ε
α
j + ε
q
j .
This information is then propagated backwards as the weights are ad-
justed according to the learning algorithm, which aims to minimize ξj. Define
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yj = {α, q−j} . The gradient of ξj with respect to the output-layer weights is
∂ξj
∂woiιj
= −2
¡
yιj − g
¡
inoιj
¢¢
g0
¡
inoιj
¢
outhij,
where i = 1, ...,Mj; ι = 1, 2; j = 1, 2. Similarly, we can find the gradient of
the error surface with respect to the hidden layer weights:
∂ξj
∂whikj
= −2g0(inhikj)xk
£¡
yιj − g
¡
inoιj
¢¢
g0
¡
inoιj
¢
woiιj
¤
,
where k = 1, ..., N. Once the gradients are calculated, the weights are ad-
justed a small amount in the opposite (negative) direction of the gradient.
The constant η, the learning-rate parameter, is introduced to smooth the
updating process.8 If we define δoιj ≡ 12(yιj − yˆιj)g
0(inoιj), we have the weight
adjustment for the output layer as
woiιj(t+ 1) = w
o
iιj(t) + ηδ
o
ιjout
h
ij.
Similarly, for the hidden layer,
whijk(t+ 1) = w
h
ijk(t) + ηδ
h
iιjxk,
where δhiιj ≡ g0(inhij)δoιjwoiιj. When the updating of weights is finished, the
firm views the next input pattern and repeats the weight-updating process.
The backward-propagation rule is a reasonable model of organizational
learning. The rule says that in each period the agents in the output layer
compare their estimates to the actual values; the information from the er-
ror is propagated backwards, so that information is transmitted down the
hierarchy. We can think of this as if the executives are sending a memoran-
dum to the other agents, telling them how they can help improve the firm’s
performance over time.
Note that the networks are “learning from scratch,” since the weights
are initially chosen at random. Thus in the first few periods, output by the
network will essentially be guesses; it takes time for the network to learn how
recognize the underlying patterns and map the inputs to the outputs with
reduced error. Below we look at the average error over time (specifically,
over 250 weight-adjustment iterations) because we are interested in how well
the firm balances the tradeoﬀ between speed and accuracy.
8For the simulations, η is fixed at 10.
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6 Organization, Learning and Cooperation:
A Simulation Experiment
This section presents the results of a simulation experiment.9 The steps of
the experiment were outlined in sections 4 and 5 above. We are mainly
interested in two diﬀerent issues. The first is whether, and how well, the two
firms can learn, i.e., if in the long run they are able to map signals from the
environment to demand conditions and the opponent’s quantity decisions.
The second is how environmental complexity, especially in the early stages
of firm interaction, and network sizes aﬀect the decision to cooperate or
defect and the profitability. For each set of parameter values, we rerun the
simulation 50 times and take averages in order to smooth out diﬀerences due
to the initial random weights.
Here we show some particular runs of the model that are representative
of its features. The robustness of these results will be verified in section 7 by
means of an econometric investigation over the parameter space.
Learning
The first question is whether firms are able to learn over time the rela-
tionship between the environment and both demand and the rival’s output
decision. In figure 2 we show the errors of firm 1.10 Both errors are nor-
malized (
p
εα1,t/αt and
q
εq1,t/q2,t) to make them comparable. We can see
that the network is able to improve both forecasts over time. The figure
also shows that, as would be expected,
p
εα1,t/αt converges to a lower level
than
q
εq1,t/q2,t. This is explained by the fact that the rival’s output is only
indirectly related to the environment.
Cooperation
Next, we see how cooperation and profits evolve. We define the coop-
eration rate as follows. First, let
cjt =
½
1, if firm j plays the shared monopoly in period t
0, if firm j plays the best response in period t
¾
.
9The simulations were performed in Mathematica. The code is available upon request.
10For the remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, we have N = 10, T = 250,
Mj = 8, ρj = 0.05, j = 1, 2.
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Figure 2: Errors of firm one over time. Moving average (MA(25)) of
p
εα1,t/αt
(black line) and
q
εq1,t/q2,t (light line).
Then, over 50 runs we take the cooperation rate for each period as c¯jt =
1
50
P50
r=1 c1rt. We plot c¯jt versus time in figure 3 for two diﬀerent “niceness”
values. If ρ1 = ρ2 = 0, the cooperation rate steadily decreases over time:
errors are systematically attributed to the rival’s unwillingness to cooperate,
and the firm will as a consequence defect most of the time. If the firm
has a suﬃciently high niceness parameter, on the other hand, increasing
proficiency in forecasts (learning) will be associated with increasing rates of
cooperation. Thus, sustained cooperation in this model becomes possible if
firms are suﬃciently tolerant facing deviations from the collusive outcome
during the learning phase.
Profits and cooperation versus complexity Complexity aﬀects learn-
ing and, therefore, cooperation rates and profits. We define average profit
and average cooperation over the T = 250 iterations as Πj = T−1
PT
t=1 πjt
and Cj = T−1
PT
t=1 c¯jt. Figure 4 plots Πj and Cj for several complexity lev-
els (N). The figure shows that all else equal, for given network sizes, the
prospect for sustained cooperation is diminished in complex environments.
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Figure 3: Evolution of firm one’s cooperation rates (MA(25)) for ρ1 = ρ2 = 0
(black line) and ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.05 (light line).
This is quite intuitive, as increased complexity makes learning harder, and
firms tend to impute undesired outcomes to noncooperative behavior from
their rival. As a consequence, they will tend to punish/defect more often.
7 Regression Results
Profits and cooperation choices depend on a number of variables, that in-
teract at diﬀerent levels (environment, firm complexity, interaction between
firms). This is why, after using particular runs to show interesting results of
our model, we need to check for the robustness of our findings. This section
will apply standard econometric techniques to a data set generated by our
model using random draws of the most interesting parameters. Each obser-
vation of the data set was built as follows: we randomly and independently
selected a set of parameters from the following parameter space: Mj ∈ [2, 25],
N ∈ [5, 50], T ∈ [50, 500], ρj ∈ [0, 0.2]. Then we let the two firms compete
for T iterations, and we recorded the average profit and cooperation rates,
Πj and Cj. Notice that, because of the way we constructed the experiment,
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Figure 4: Firm one’s average profits and cooperation rates versus environ-
mental complexity. M1 =M2 = 8, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.05, N = 10.
firms are symmetric; we only report the results for firm one.
Given that we are working with artificial data, it is important to verify
that the standard ordinary least squares assumptions, and hence the Gauss
Markov Theorem, apply to our analysis (see Wooldridge, 2003). The first
assumption is that the underlying population regression function is linear
in the coeﬃcients. This assumption is valid in our case, since we use high
order polynomial terms with linear coeﬃcients to fit the data. As is a stan-
dard result, a polynomial of high enough order can approximate any function
with any specified degree of accuracy. Next, the method we used to gener-
ate the experiment guarantees that the exogenous variables are a randomly
determined, unbiased sample. The random drawing of parameters from uni-
form distributions also guarantees that errors have zero mean and no serial
correlation. In addition, we can further assume that errors are asymptoti-
cally normal because of the randomness involved with both the initial weight
generation and the random drawing of the environmental states.
Finally, we faced a dilemma about the choice of regressors. Given the
highly complex nature of the data, we found that using the standard tests
for functional form—adjusted R2, the Aikake Information Criterion and Ram-
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sey’s RESET test—we would not reject a polynomial of relatively high order
(for example, the coeﬃcient on M81 was statistically significant at the 99%
confidence level). However, much simpler regressions gave very similar re-
sults in terms of goodness of fit (the simple regression had an R2 of 0.94
for Π1 and of 0.925 for C1; the complex regression had R2 of 0.96 and 0.94,
respectively). Including many higher order polynomials did not materially
increase the explanatory power of the regression and potentially over-fit the
data. Furthermore, including these additional terms made essentially imper-
ceptible changes in the eﬀect of the exogenous variables on the dependant
variables. For these reasons we present here the results of the relatively
simple regressions.
Dependent Variable: 10, 000 · Π1
Variable Coeﬀ. Variable Coeﬀ. Variable Coeﬀ.
C 126
(4.8)
T 3 0.00002
(0.0)
ρ1 −635.
(27)
M1 20.3
(0.77)
T 4 0.0000
(0.0)
ρ21 5492
(285)
M21 −2.28
(0.09)
N 1.51
(0.43)
ρ31 −12829
(892)
M31 0.092
(0.01)
N2 −0.172
(0.03)
ρ2 1592
(51)
M41 −0.001
(0.00)
N3 0.004
(0.00)
ρ22 −16334
(981)
M2 −1.85
(0.10)
N4 −0.0000
(0.00)
ρ22 73334
(7146)
M22 0.094
(0.003)
M1 · T 0.010
(0.00)
ρ42 −119671
(17403)
M1 ·M2 −0.085
(0.003)
T ·N −0.003
(0.001)
ρ1 · ρ2 −508
(44)
T 2.43
(0.06)
M1 ·N 0.125
(0.004)
T 2 −0.011
(0.00)
M2 ·N −0.013
(0.00)
R2 = 0.943 Number obs.: 10, 000
Table 1: Regression results for firm one. Dependent variable is 10, 000 · Π1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The results for profit are reported in table 1, from which we can draw a
number of conclusions.
• The regression confirms the finding that we discussed in other papers
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Figure 5: Π1(M1,M2). Bilateral relationship (quadrant a, where the contin-
uous line is Π1 = f(M1, 10) and the dotted line is Π1 = f(10,M2)) and joint
eﬀect (quadrant b).
(Barr and Saraceno, 2002, 2005) on the humped-shaped relationship be-
tween firm dimension and profits. The optimal (i.e., profit maximizing)
size is determined by balancing speed and accuracy in learning. Figure
5 plots the coeﬃcients of size (M1 and M2) from table 1. The continu-
ous line of quadrant a shows that, at first, profit increases with own firm
size, and then drops, showing that the optimal balance of speed and
accuracy lies away from the extremes. The dotted line shows that in-
creasing the rival’s size has a modest u-shaped eﬀect on a firm’s profits.
A rival that is very small or very large confers a competitive advantage
on the firm because it is either relatively inaccurate (when small) or
too slow (when large). However, the overwhelming importance of own
size in determining profits also emerges when we look at the joint ef-
fect (quadrant b), where the eﬀect of M2 and of the interaction term is
relatively small.
• Environmental complexity N has a negative and nonlinear eﬀect on
profits, while increasing the time to learn (T ) has a positive eﬀect.
Both findings conform to intuition.
• The relationship between profit and niceness is shown in figure 6, where
we plot the regression coeﬃcients of ρ1 and ρ2. Quadrant a shows that
extreme values of own willingness to cooperate, are more profitable:
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Figure 6: Profit of firm one against the niceness parameters ρ1and ρ2, bilat-
eral relationships (quadrants a and b, where ρ2 = 0 and ρ1 = 0, respectively),
and joint eﬀect.
extreme types (“harsh” or “soft”) have a more predictable behavior;
the opponent will thus be able to learn it better, and act consequently.
This will result in higher profits for both firms. Being in the middle, on
the other hand, sends contradictory signals to the competitor, and does
not favor learning. Such a result would disappear were the firm acting
in a world without uncertainty. On the other hand, higher willingness to
cooperate from the opponent (larger ρ2, quadrant b) yields larger profits
for firm 1.When we allow ρ1 and ρ2 to change contemporaneously, we
can confirm this finding.
We now turn to the other dependent variable, the one specific to this
paper—the degree of cooperation; from the regression coeﬃcients (table 2) we
can conclude that:
• As expected, larger values of ρ1 and ρ2 increase the cooperation rate
(fig. 7, right quadrant). This is especially true for own willingness ρ1.
• Also expected is the negative relationship between environmental com-
plexity (N) and degree of cooperation. In a more complex environment,
uncertainty makes it harder for a firm to detect defection by the oppo-
nent, who has thus less incentive to cooperate.
• Amore interesting picture relates the cooperation rate with firm dimen-
sion (fig. 7 left quadrant). Concerning a firm’s own size (the contin-
uous line), the relationship is negative, albeit slightly so; larger firms
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Dependent Variable: 10, 000 · C1
Variable Coeﬀ. Variable Coeﬀ. Variable Coeﬀ.
C 3613
(55)
T 2 −0.003
(0.00)
ρ2 26970
(1237)
M1 −9.4
(2.5)
N −15.5
(0.82)
ρ22 −262625
(25083)
M21 0.22
(0.08)
M2 ·N 0.844
(0.04)
ρ32 1069786
(188273)
M2 223
(17)
T ·N −0.0271
(0.00)
ρ42 −1537810
(467083)
M22 −22.6
(2.3)
ρ1 84001
(1235)
M1 · ρ1 29.7
(8.9)
M32 0.934
(0.13)
ρ21 −700449
(25094)
M42 −0.015
(0.00)
ρ31 2996843
(188970)
T 3.75
(0.14)
ρ41 −5197243
(469096)
R2 = 0.925 Number obs.: 10, 000
Table 2: Regression results. Dependent variable is 10,000*cooperation rate
of firm one. Standard errors in parentheses.
tend to cooperate less often. Interestingly, a rival’s size has a rela-
tively strong influence on a firm’s cooperation rate, which furthermore
is hump shaped. Notice the similarity with the profit function, which
suggests a correlation with learning performance: the better a rival is
able to learn the environment, the more likely a firm is to cooperate,
since its rivals actions are less noisy.
To summarize, the regressions confirm the robustness of the results of
section 6. This model conforms to previous findings (Barr and Saraceno,
2002; 2005) on the relationship between firm profitability, size and the en-
vironment it faces. Environmental complexity negatively aﬀects profits, and
the tradeoﬀ between speed and accuracy emerges in this setting as well, giv-
ing a hump shape relationship between firm size and profit. We also showed
that firms take advantage of their opponent’s willingness to cooperate, and
that intermediate levels of niceness yield worse results than extreme (harsh
or soft) attitudes. The regressions also show that cooperation is hampered
by more complex environments, and, of course, by lower willingness to co-
operate. In addition, our regression analysis sheds light on the relationship
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Figure 7: Left: C1 as a function ofM1 (continuous) andM2 (dashed). Right:
C1 as a function of ρ1 (continuous) and ρ2 (dashed).
between firms size and cooperation.
8 Network Equilibria
In this section we explore the concept of network equilibrium with regard to
the two important factors that aﬀect performance: network size and the level
of niceness. We define a network equilibrium (NE) as a Nash equilibrium in
Mj and ρj, i.e., a quadruple {M∗1 , ρ∗1,M∗2 , ρ∗2} such that neither firm finds it
profitable to change its network size or niceness given its rival’s choice.
Πj
¡
M∗j ,M
∗
−j, ρ
∗
j , ρ
∗
−j
¢
≥ Πj
¡
Mj,M
∗
−j, ρj, ρ
∗
−j
¢
, ∀Mj, ρj j = 1, 2.
Notice that we do not endogenize the choices of Mj and ρj. Rather, we
conduct a kind of comparative statics exercise, whereby we study the NEs for
given environmental conditions. To run this experiment, we fix the number
of iterations at T = 250.We have each firm play against a rival of all possible
size and niceness values. For example, we begin by settingM1 = 2, and ρ1 =
0. Then firm one, with its size and niceness fixed, plays against a rival of all
diﬀerent sizesM2 ∈ {2, 3, ..., 20} , and niceness values ρ2 ∈ {0, 0.125, ..., 0.2} .
Then we repeat the exercise forM1 = 3, and ρ1 = 0, and so on. For each set of
M 0s and ρ0s we generate 50 runs and take averages to smooth out fluctuations
from each run. We then determine, for each complexity value and for each
firm, the network size and niceness value that is the most profitable against
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Figure 8: Optimal profit and firm dimension, industry averages.
its rival. That is, we search for each firm’s “best response” network size
and niceness. The equilibrium is then given by the sizes and niceness values
which are a “best response” for both firms.
We repeated these runs for environmental complexity values of N =
5, 10, ..., 30, and calculated the NEs that emerged (for each number of in-
puts there were always more than one equilibrium). Finally, we averaged the
total number of managers of the two firms for each equilibrium to obtain an
equilibrium “industry” size and averaged the ρ0s for an average “industry”
niceness. This gave us a data set of 96 NEs (an average of 16 per complexity
level).
Profits and Network Size Figure 8 shows that higher complexity
requires larger firm size in equilibrium, which is necessary to better learn
its rival’s actions and the environment. Furthermore, the increased diﬃculty
of learning is associated with lower profits because the additional benefit of
larger firm size does not fully oﬀset the marginal increase in errors that firms
make due to increased environmental complexity.
Figure 9 shows, however, that a clear pattern between complexity and
cooperation does not appear. The equilibrium average ρ shows a slight in-
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crease in complexity, going from 0.078 to 0.086. Interestingly, the degree of
cooperation does not seem to be related to the number of inputs. In fact,
even if as shown in table 2, a firm’s own niceness has a large impact on its
cooperation rate, the eﬀect of a rival’s niceness is more modest. Thus, the
eﬀect of the interaction of the two parameters on total industry behavior
will not be strong. In addition, on one hand complexity is likely to lower
cooperation, but on the other hand, it will also generate larger firm sizes in
order for firms to better learn the environment, which is likely to increase
cooperation. As a consequence larger firm sizes and more complexity will
cancel each other out.
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Figure 9: Equilibrium cooperation rates and niceness values. Industry aver-
ages.
9 Conclusion
This paper has presented a model of firm learning and cooperation. We
investigate the prospects for cooperation when firms must learn to map en-
vironmental signals to changing demand and on their rival’s output decision.
We demonstrate that increased environmental complexity is associated with
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lower rates of cooperation and lower profitability. We show that in complex
environments frequent cooperation is more sustainable when firms are more
willing to be “nice” in the sense that firms are less likely to defect if they
estimate their rival will defect. Further, we show that firm size has an eﬀect
on both profits and cooperation. Increasing own size increases profits up
to a point and then profits decrease. This tradeoﬀ is due to the fact that
adding agents improves accuracy but slows learning. We also see a non-linear
relationship between the firm size and its cooperation rate; in particular a
humped-shaped relationship between a rival’s size and a firm’s cooperation
rates. Finally, we have shown that in a network equilibrium, increasing com-
plexity is associated with larger average firm size but, given the interplay of
diﬀerent and conflicting factors, has little eﬀect on cooperation.
Clearly our model of the firm is highly stylized, but the goal here is
to show how the firm-as-learning-network can aﬀect and be aﬀected by the
competitive environment. The aim of our work is to illustrate how firm
organization can have a strategic impact on both firm’s profits, and on its
ability to send and receive competitive information. Large organizations
emerge precisely because no single agent can do even a small fraction of the
work needed to supply goods to the marketplace and to maximize profits.
A firm’s environment is often quite complex and thus some agents must be
devoted to learning the nature of this environment. Our model illustrates
that multi-agent learning can have an impact on not only the firm, but also
on industry wide outcomes. In other words organizational structure can
aﬀect tacit communication between organizations, when they are unable to
communicate directly.
We believe that economics has only begun to think about the firm as
a collection of several agents; yet how a firm organizes itself can have im-
portant consequences for competition. The large body of literature within
management studies on firm reorganization and restructuring is evidence of
the causes and eﬀects of firm organization on performance and hence com-
petition. (See, for example, Strategic Management Journal, special issue on
corporate restructuring, 1993.)
The resource allocation and organizational problems of real firms are quite
complex. And perhaps because of this complexity, economists have shied
away from trying to present models of the firm as an organization of agents.
Our work is but a first attempt to model this complexity. The next steps in
this process would be the attempt introduce some more realistic agents and
firm behaviors, such as including heterogeneity in strategies and endogenizing
28
the hierarchical structure of the network.
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